We study the equilibrium determinants of …rm-level heterogeneity in a model in which …rms can choose between di¤erent probability distributions when drawing productivity at the entry stage and explore the implications in closed and open economy. One novel result is that export opportunities, by increasing payo¤s in the tail, induce …rms to draw technology from riskier distributions. When more productive …rms also pay higher wages, trade ampli…es wage dispersion by inducing …rms to take more risk ex-ante and hence making them more unequal ex-post. Our model is consistent with new evidence on how …rm-level heterogeneity varies across U.S. industries. JEL Classi…cation: F12, F16, E24.
Introduction
Current research in international trade puts …rm-level heterogeneity at a center stage.
As documented by a growing empirical literature, …rms di¤er in size and productivity even within narrowly de…ned industries and these di¤erences vary systematically with trade participation. In particular, exporters are bigger and more productive than nonexporters, and they pay higher wages. Firm heterogeneity also has crucial implications for other macroeconomic outcomes, such as aggregate e¢ ciency. Yet, despite the growing attention that …rm-level productivity di¤erences are attracting, we still have a limited understanding of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this heterogeneity.
Although the distribution of the entire population of existing …rms has some common characteristics that have been documented extensively, these aggregate statistics mask signi…cant heterogeneity across sectors and even between countries. For example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) shows that cross-sector variation in measures of …rm heterogeneity has important e¤ects on …rm strategies. Poschke (2014) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009) document instead di¤erences in the …rm-size distribution across countries. For instance, …rm size is typically found to be larger but also more dispersed in the United States than in Spain or Italy. Moreover, given that more productive …rms pay higher wages, …rm heterogeneity is likely to map into wage dispersion, and wage inequality varies signi…cantly across countries. 1 Besides these scant observations, systematic evidence and theoretical explanations for di¤erences in …rm heterogeneity are still missing. The primary goal of this paper is to take a …rst step towards …lling this gap.
We start our analysis by documenting some overlooked facts regarding how a synthetic measure of …rm heterogeneity, the standard deviation of the log of sales, varies across sectors and time in the U.S. economy. We …nd that this measure of dispersion can di¤er by a factor of two between 4-digit NAICS industries, that it has increased on average by 25.9 per cent between 1997 and 2007, and that it correlates with industry characteristics such as average sales and export intensity. Motivated by this evidence, we propose one possible explanation based on the idea that the observed heterogeneity stems from the choice of risk in the innovation strategies of entering …rms. More precisely, we propose a model where …rms can choose between di¤erent probability distributions when drawing productivity at the entry stage and we explore the implications for the equilibrium distribution of …rms and wages in closed and open economies. Leading models of heterogeneous …rms take the probability distribution from which …rms draw productivity as given and characterize the resulting distribution of …rm-level characteristics through the dynamics of entry and exit, and sometimes innovation by incumbents. Prominent example are Melitz (2003) , Luttmer (2010) and more recently Jones and Kim (2014) .
The aim of this project is to take a complementary and perhaps more fundamental approach, namely, to recognize that …rms can a¤ect directly the expected dispersion of productivity by choosing the riskiness of their initial entry investment.
Although the success in starting a new enterprise is inherently uncertain, …rms can deliberately choose between small projects with relatively safe returns and large projects with risky payo¤s. Such a trade o¤ is very familiar to anyone pursuing academic research, but is also common in the world of business. For instance, designing and assembling a new variety of laptop PCs, which mostly requires the use of established technologies, is safer and less costly than developing an entirely new product, such as tablet computers.
In fact, the …rst tablet-like products date back to the 1980s, but did not reach success until the release of the iPad in 2010. After decades of research, Apple's investment was rewarded with the sale of more than 200 million units over a period of four years only.
We formalize these ideas in a multi-industry model à la Melitz (2003) in which …rms can draw a random productivity level upon paying a …xed entry cost and there is a …xed export cost. We modify this setup by allowing …rms to choose the variance of the probability distribution from which to draw their productivity. Since expected pro…ts are increasing in the dispersion of productivity, assuming that draws from riskier distributions are more costly delivers a well-de…ned trade-o¤. A …rst result of the paper is to show how the optimal point in this trade-o¤ depends on industry-level characteristics, such as …xed costs of production and the elasticity of demand, in a way consistent with the patterns found in the data. A second key result is that export opportunities induce …rms to draw technology from a riskier distribution. The reason is that trade reallocates pro…ts in favor of the most productive …rms, thereby increasing the payo¤s in the right tail. Thus, export opportunities increase the returns to risky investment.
Finally, we extend the model to show how …rm heterogeneity can map into income and wage inequality (for instance, as in Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010). When more productive …rms pay higher wages, we obtain a third novel result: trade ampli…es wage dispersion by inducing …rms to take on more risk ex-ante and hence making them more unequal ex-post.
To the best of our knowledge, the choice of the riskiness of innovation, and its aggregate implications, has received little attention. Papers on technological change sometimes consider the distinction between radical and incremental innovation (e.g., Acemoglu and Cao, 2011) . But these types of innovations di¤er more in the degree to which they replace or complement existing technologies, rather than in the variance of the potential outcomes. In any case, studying how di¤erent types of innovations a¤ect the distribution of …rms and income is an underexplored and promising area of research.
The large literature on trade with heterogeneous …rms started by Melitz (2003) does study the implications of export opportunities for the distribution of existing …rms. 2 As it is well-known, trade can make …rms more unequal by reallocating pro…ts and workers from the least to the most productive …rms. This e¤ect is however very di¤erent from the one we emphasize, in that it abstracts from the possibility that trade changes the fundamental reason why …rms are di¤erent, i.e., the unconditional productivity distribution. Moreover, the focus of our paper is on measures of dispersion of …rms'attributes, such as the log of sales, that are scale invariant rather than other characteristics, such as average size or the productivity cuto¤ for exit, that have been studied more extensively. Similarly, several papers have shown, both theoretically and empirically, that trade impacts wage inequality because exporters pay higher wages. 3 In our model, however, the e¤ect of trade works not only through the exporters'wage premium, but also by making the entire wage schedule steeper, with di¤erent implications. Finally, some recent papers endogenize productivity via ex-post decisions on product scope, innovation and changes in organization. 4 These models show that trade liberalization can raise …rm-level productivity, but do not focus on its dispersion. Yet, combining our ex-ante choice of innovation risk with ex-post decisions that can a¤ect an initial realization of productivity seems a natural step forward to develop a comprehensive theory of how productivity di¤erences emerge and evolve.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we document some novel stylized facts regarding how the dispersion of log-sales varies across sectors and time in the U.S. economy. Motivated by these empirical observations, in Section 3 we propose a closed-economy model where di¤erences in the variance of …rm-level outcomes stem from the possibility of choosing the probability distribution from which to draw productivity at the entry stage. Section 4 adds costly trade and shows that more export opportunities induce …rms to draw their productivity from riskier distributions, thereby generating more heterogeneity in equilibrium. In Section 5 we consider the implications of the model for income and wage inequality. Section 6 concludes.
Motivating Evidence
In this section, we document how the dispersion of sales of U.S. …rms varies across sectors and time, and how it correlates with a number of sector characteristics. First, we show that the dispersion of sales di¤ers signi…cantly across sectors and it has increased over time. Second, we report panel regressions suggesting that higher dispersion at the industry level is systematically associated with larger scale in terms of sales, higher demand elasticity, export intensity and capital intensity.
Our measures of dispersion are the variance and standard deviation of the logarithm of sales at …rm level. We focus on sales because they are an easy-to-observe, synthetic measure of overall size, and we take the log to make the variance scale invariant. We compute these variables using data from the U.S. Census of Manufacturing for years 1997 and 2007. Data on (receipts of) sales and number of …rms and establishments are available at 6-digit NAICS industry level for the universe of U.S. …rms, aggregated into sales-size categories. 5 Since unfortunately we do not have access to …rm-level data, we follow Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) in assuming that all …rms falling within the same sales-bin have the same value as the group mean, and using the number of …rms in each category as weights. In particular, we consider each bin in a 6-digit NAICS industry as a single observation, and compute the variance of log-sales aggregating appropriately the observations at 4-digit industry level. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) show that this methodology to compute dispersions yields results that are highly correlated with direct measures based on the entire population. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics. For 3-digit manufacturing sectors, it shows the average standard deviation of log-sales in 2007, its minimum and maximum in each 4-digit subindustry, and the average percentage change over the previous ten years. 6 For convenience, industries are To further describe the data, we now exploit the variation across 4-digit industries and over time to study how dispersion in revenues correlates with a number of sector characteristics. Table 2 reports panel regressions where the dependent variable is the variance of the log of sales. All speci…cations are estimated both with random and industry-speci…c …xed e¤ects, and standard errors are clustered by industry. Columns 1 and 2 show that our measure of dispersion is positively and signi…cantly correlated with sales per …rm, while it correlates negatively with employment per …rm. There is no correlation, instead, with the number of …rms in the sector. This suggests that dispersion is higher in sectors where …rms are larger in terms of revenue. In columns 3 and 4, we add export intensity, measured as the ratio of exports to sales, and the demand elasticity estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). 7 The coe¢ cients for both variables are positive and signi…cant, meaning that sales are more dispersed in more export-oriented sectors producing less di¤erentiated goods. Finally, in columns 5 and Note: the dependent variable is the variance of the log of sales. The number of …rms is expressed in millions, sales per …rm are in US$ millions, employment per …rm is in thousand workers. Export intensity is computed as exports over sales, capital intensity is computed as the non-labor share in value added, skill intensity as non-production workers per …rm. The sample period includes years 1997 and 2007. Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, are reported in parenthesis. Signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively 6, we also include capital intensity, computed as the non-labor share in value added, and skill intensity, proxied by the number of non-production workers per …rm. 8 The coe¢ cients suggest that log-sales are more dispersed in capital-intensive sectors, while the correlation with skill intensity is not always signi…cant. The coe¢ cients for sales per …rm, export intensity and demand elasticity remain positive and signi…cant across all speci…cations. 9 Although these correlations do not establish any causal relationship between the covariates, they uncover some new systematic patterns in the data. 10 In the rest of the paper, we propose one possible theory that can help explaining these 8 Data on sales, value added, employment and non-production workers are obtained from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Database. The dependent variable and the number of …rms are computed with data from the U.S. Census. Export data, from the Center for International Data and NBER, refer to years 1997 and 2006. Since we control for employment, non-production workers measures skill intensity in the workforce. 9 In the worst case, export intensity is signi…cant at the 8% level. 10 Exploring more in detail these interesting patterns goes beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
observations by endogenizing the dispersion in productivity across …rms at the sector level.
Closed-Economy Model
We now build a multi-sector, one factor, model of monopolistic competition between heterogeneous …rms along the lines of Melitz and Redding (2014) . After paying a …xed entry cost, …rms draw their productivity from a distribution and exit if they cannot pro…tably cover a …xed cost of production. Di¤erently from Melitz (2003) , we allow …rms to a¤ect the "riskiness" of their entry investment by choosing the distribution from which to draw their productivity. In this section we study the determinants of entry risk and how it a¤ects the equilibrium distributions in a closed economy. We defer to the next section the case in which …rms can engage in costly trade. For simplicity, we consider a static model in which entry and production decisions are all simultaneous.
Preferences
Consider an economy populated by a unit measure of identical households of size L with quasi-linear preferences over consumption of a homogenous good q 0 and di¤erentiated goods produced in I industries:
Each industry i 2 f1; :::; Ig produces di¤erentiated varieties and preferences over these varieties take the constant elasticity of substitution form:
where x i (!) is consumption of variety !, i denotes the set of varieties produced in sector i and i is the elasticity of substitution between varieties within an industry. We denote by p i (!) the price of variety ! in industry i and by P i the ideal price of the consumption basket X i :
The demand for the di¤erentiated basket X i is X i = ( i =P i ) 1=(1 i ) and the demand for each individual variety is
The demand for the homogenous good q 0 is residual. We assume that income of each household is su¢ ciently high to always guarantee a positive consumption of the homogenous goods, which is chosen as the numeraire. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on a single sector and derive results that do not depend on general equilibrium e¤ects.
For this reason, and to save notation, from now on we remove the index i with the understanding that all parameters can potentially vary across sectors.
Problem of the Firm
Recall that we now focus on the industry equilibrium of a single sector i 2 f1; :::; Ig.
Within each sector, every variety ! is produced by monopolistically competitive …rms that are heterogeneous in their labor productivity, '. Since all …rms with the same productivity behave symmetrically, we index …rms by '. There are …xed costs of production, f , and of entry, F; in units of the numeraire good. Upon entry, a …rm can choose to randomly draw its productivity from a menu of distributions di¤ering in the riskiness of their realizations and pays the corresponding entry cost. Next, the …rm faces standard production and pricing decisions. We solve the problem backwards: …rst, we describe the strategy of a …rm with a given productivity and then solve the problem of choosing the productivity distribution given rational expectation on the industry equilibrium.
Given a productivity ' and a marginal cost of w=', where w is the wage, the …rm will choose its price and whether to exit so as maximize pro…t, ('), subject to a downwardsloping demand curve with elasticity . The …rst-order conditions for this problem imply that …rms set prices equal to a constant markup over the marginal cost,
and exit if (') < 0. Using (1) and (2), we can express pro…t as a function of productivity:
where A = w 1 1 XP . Since pro…ts are increasing in ', the …rm will exit whenever its productivity is below the cuto¤ ' = (f =A) 1= ( 1) .
Combining the pricing and exit decision, we can write ex-ante expected pro…t of a …rm drawing its productivity from a distribution with cumulative distribution G (') as:
To study the incentives for …rms to choose the "riskiness" of their initial entry investment, we assume that G (') belongs to a family of Pareto distributions with di¤erent shape parameters:
where ' min > 0 is the lower bound of the support and the shape parameter is 1=v.
Written in this way, v can be interpreted as an index of the variance of the distribution.
More precisely, v is equal to the standard deviation of the log of ' and will be one of the key determinants of the equilibrium distributions of the log of …rm characteristics, such as sales. The bounds v > 0 and v < 1 rule out the possibility of a degenerate distribution and ensure a …nite mean for v. Note also that the mean of ' is ' min (1 v) 1 which increases with v. Thus, our assumption that …rms can choose between distributions with di¤erent v embeds the notion that high expected payo¤s are associated to more risk. As we will show shortly, this property is not strictly needed for many of the results of the paper. Yet, it seems a very natural property and we conform to it.
There are several reasons for focusing on Pareto distributions. Besides being tractable and widely used, it has been shown that Pareto distributions approximate well some observed …rm-level characteristics (especially in the right tail). Thus, it is an empirically reasonable assumption. Moreover, the Pareto distribution has the useful property that power functions of ' are also Pareto distributed, although with a di¤erent shape parameter. This helps to map the model to the data because it will allow us to obtain closed-form solutions for the measure of dispersion computed in Section 2.
Substituting A (' ) 1 = f into (4), assuming ' > ' min (so that there is selection) and using G ('), we can solve for expected pro…ts:
where it proves convenient to de…ne & 1 and we assume v < 1=& for E [ ] to be …nite. It is easy to see that expected ex-ante pro…ts are increasing in v:
There are three reasons why a higher v, and hence more dispersion in the distribution of productivity draws, implies higher expected pro…ts. First, as already seen, a higher v raises average productivity directly. Second, given the shape of the Pareto distribution, it increases the probability of drawing a productivity above the exit cuto¤ ' . 11 Third, even in the absence of the previous e¤ects, more dispersion increases expected pro…ts whenever the pro…t function is convex in prices and hence in '. As equation (3) shows, this is the case when > 2 (i.e., for & > 1). To see this, suppose now that ' min = ' (1 v) so that the mean of the distribution is constant at ' and an increase in v corresponds to a mean-preserving spread. Then:
which is necessarily positive when & > 1 ( > 2), even in the absence of selection e¤ects (i.e., when ' ! ' min ). The intuition is that …rms can expand to take advantage of good realizations of productivity and contract to insure against bad realizations, making them potentially risk loving. This is a well-known result, sometimes referred to as the Having characterized the value of drawing productivity from riskier distributions, we need to specify its cost. In order to have a well de…ned trade-o¤, we assume that the entry cost F is an increasing and convex function of v: F 0 (v) > 0 and F 00 (v) > 0.
The fact that this entry cost is increasing in v (at a su¢ cient rate) is not just needed to prevent …rms from choosing trivially the distribution with the highest dispersion; it also captures the sensible notion that risky projects with high expected payo¤s require bigger investments. All in all, although our description of the entry risk faced by …rms is admittedly stylized, it accords well with common sense. 12 We are now in the position to solve the entry stage. The problem is greatly simpli…ed by the fact that all …rms in a given sector are ex-ante identical and therefore face the same problem of choosing v so as to maximize expected pro…ts minus the entry cost:
To ensure that the maximand is concave, we impose
Then, the …rst-order condition for v is
Concavity and implicit di¤erentiation allow us to sign the comparative statics for v. If interior, the unique equilibrium choice of v is increasing in the elasticity of substitution, &, average pro…t, E [ ], and the exit cuto¤, ' =' min . However, both E [ ] and ' =' min are endogenous and to solve for them we now turn to the industry equilibrium. 12 Equivalently, we could have assumed that …rms can choose some other variable s which in turn a¤ects positively v. If v(s) is a su¢ ciently convex function, we would obtain a non-increasing marginal bene…t of raising s.
Industry Equilibrium
Free entry implies that ex-ante expected pro…ts must be equal to the entry cost: E [ ] = F (v). Substituting (5) into this condition, we can solve for the exit cuto¤:
To make sure that ' =' min > 1, we impose f > max v2 [v; v] fF (v) (1=&v 1)g. Next,
and (8); we can rewrite the …rst-order condition for v in the case of an interior solution (7) as:
Under regularity conditions that we take for granted, equation (9) has an interior solution over the relevant range v 2 [v; v]. 13 Moreover, provided that F (v) is su¢ ciently convex, the solution will be unique. Although the possibility of multiple equilibria is interesting, exploring it goes outside the scope of this paper and we therefore disregard this possibility. 14 We can now study the equilibrium determinants of v. A higher …xed cost of production, f , increases the exit cuto¤ and hence raises the bene…t of choosing a more dispersed distribution. A higher elasticity of substitution raises the value of v by making profits more convex in productivity and by increasing the exit cuto¤. Moreover, since of
and F 0 (v) > 0, the model predicts a positive association between average pro…ts (or sales) and the variance of productivity.
The choice of v a¤ects the equilibrium distribution of …rm characteristics. Consider the distribution of revenues, which matches closely the variable documented in Section 2. It is easy to show that revenues are a power function of productivity:
r(') = r(' ) ('=' ) & . Then, from the properties of the Pareto distribution, r(') is 13 Su¢ cient conditions are F 0 (v) = 0 with F (v) > 0 and F 0 ( v) ! 1 with v < 1=&: 14 One can imagine a situation in which the expectation of high pro…ts in equilibrium induces …rms to choose a high initial investment, which in turn con…rms the initial expectation that …rms be large. Similarly to Bon…glioli and Gancia (2014) , this multiplicity may help explain cross-country di¤erences in the prevalence of small and large …rms and other outcomes. also Pareto distributed with c.d.f. G r (r) = 1 (r min =r) 1=v& , for r > r min = f . 15 Hence, the log of revenue is exponential with a standard deviation equal to v&. This immediately implies that di¤erences in the choice of entry risk across sectors will translate into di¤erences in the equilibrium distributions of …rm characteristics as summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that the solution to (9) is unique and interior. Then, the equilibrium dispersion of …rm productivity and revenue, as measured by the variance of the log of ' and r('), is larger in sectors with a higher …xed cost and higher elasticity of substitution between varieties.
These results are consistent with the empirical correlations documented in Section 2. 16 
Trade and Equilibrium Firm Heterogeneity
We now extend the model by adding the possibility for …rms to export their varieties subject to …xed and variable costs. This will lead to the familiar results that only the most productive …rms export and that trade forces the least productive …rms out. This ex-post reallocation of revenues will have new implications for the ex-ante entry stage:
by increasing the payo¤s in the tail, trade will induce …rms to take on more risk and draw their productivity from more dispersed distributions.
Consider a world economy composed, for simplicity, of two symmetric countries. To serve the foreign market, …rms must incur a …xed cost f x in units of the numeraire and an iceberg variable cost such that > 1 units must be shipped for one unit to arrive at destination. The presence of a …xed trade cost implies that only the most productive …rms choose to serve the foreign market. Formally, notice that, in analogy to (3), pro…ts from exporting are x (') = A ('= ) 1 f x . These pro…ts would be negative for …rms 15 If ' follows a Pareto(' ; z), then x ln ('=' ) is distributed as an exponential with parameter z. Then, any power function of ' of the type A' B , with A and B constant, is distributed as a Pareto (A (' ) B ; z=B), since A' B = A (' ) B e Bx with Bx Exp(z=B), by the properties of the exponential distribution. 16 Although there is no capital in the model, one could interpret the …xed cost of production, which is in units of the numeraire, as a proxy for capital expenditures. Notice also that a higher elasticity of substitution, &, increases the variance of log revenues both directly and through its impact on v. with productivity ' < ' x = (f x =A)
1=& . As usual, we restrict attention to the space of parameters such that ' x =' = (f x =f ) 1=& > 1, so that there is a range of …rms with ' 2 [' ; ' x ] operating in the domestic market only, while the most productive …rms also export.
Under these assumptions, ex-ante expected pro…ts are:
where the two terms represent expected pro…ts from the domestic and the foreign market.
Solving the integrals yields:
To study how export opportunities a¤ect the value of drawing productivity from a riskier distribution, we compute again the elasticity of expected pro…ts to v:
Comparing this derivative to (6), we see that choosing a riskier distribution yields now a new advantage: conditional on surviving, it increases the probability of reaching the export cuto¤, ' x . Moreover, as it is well known and we show next, ' =' min is higher with trade.
As in autarky, we solve for the equilibrium v by imposing the free-entry condition, (v) . This condition allows us to …nd the exit cuto¤:
As expected, the exit cuto¤ is higher than in autarky and is increasing in the barriers to export. For convenience, we now de…ne ' =' x = (f =f x ) 1=& = and use it as a synthetic measure of trade openness. This index, which varies between zero and one, only depends on exogenous parameters and determines the fraction of exporting …rms, which is equal to 1=v . Using this notation and (12) into (11), we can show how trade a¤ects the elasticity of expected pro…ts to v, and hence the incentive to draw productivity from riskier distribution:
In words, more openness raises unambiguously the return from riskier productivity draws. This result is intuitive: trade o¤ers new pro…table opportunities, but only to the most productive …rms and hence reallocates pro…ts to the right tail of the distribution. In turn, a higher v (a lower shape parameter of the distribution of productivity)
increases the probability mass in that tail. This is one of the main results of the paper:
the chance of winning the extra prize of exporting induces …rms to take a riskier bet at the entry stage. Notice also that even in the extreme case in which all …rms export (' =' x ! 1), v will be higher in the trading equilibrium than in autarky because of the higher …xed cost faced by each …rm (f + f x instead of f ).
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Following the same steps as in autarky, the equilibrium v is implicitly determined by:
Since the left-hand side is increasing in openness (this follows from 13), and assuming again the solution to be unique and interior, more openness leads to a higher equilibrium v and hence more productivity dispersion.
These results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in openness, as measured by the fraction of exporters, induces …rms to choose riskier productivity draws (higher v) and raises the equilibrium dispersion of …rm productivity, as measured by the variance of the log of '.
An additional interesting implication of this model is that trade has a new e¤ect of productivity. Since a higher v also raises the mean of ', export opportunities induce …rms to choose riskier technologies with higher expected returns. As a result, in an equilibrium with trade …rms will be more productive, not just because of the usual selection e¤ect, but also because …rms choose more costly, but on average more e¢ cient,
technologies. This prediction is also of intuitive appeal: the higher premium for success in the global economy makes …rms more "ambitious"by choosing a bigger (and riskier) investment in the entry stage.
Of course, the analytical results derived in this section partly hinge on functional form assumptions and on the convenient properties of Pareto distributions. Yet, we expect the main mechanism to hold more in general. In particular, as long as trade reallocates pro…ts in favor of exporters and exporting …rms are a minority, trade will increase the payo¤ in the tails and hence raise the return from taking a riskier bet on productivity.
From Firm Heterogeneity to Income Inequality
We now explore the implications of our theory for income and wage inequality. This as a natural step: the distribution of productivity is likely to be a major determinant of the distribution of wages because in the data more productive …rms pay higher wages.
We therefore extend the model to allow for di¤erences in wages across …rms. This will yield two main results: …rst, it will highlight a new channel through which trade can increase wage inequality and, second, it will identify some additional variables a¤ecting the choice of risk at the entry stage.
In principle, our theory can be used to study top-income inequality. An immediate way of doing this is to draw a link between pro…ts and entrepreneurial income. For example, one could assume that there is a class of agents, entrepreneurs, who are the only ones who can enter and start new …rms. These agents may be able to …nance part of the entry cost externally and will be the residual claimants on a share of pro…ts.
Recent models along these lines include Jones and Kim (2014) Redding (2010, HIR henceforth) workers matched randomly with heterogeneous …rms draw a match-speci…c ability which is not observed and …rms can invest in costly screening. In equilibrium, more productive …rms screen workers more intensively to exclude those with lower ability. As a result, they have workforces of higher average ability and pay higher wages. These models yield an exporter wage premium and have been found to have considerable empirical support (e.g., Helpman et al. 2014 ). We therefore now borrow the framework of HIR to study the implications of our theory for wage dispersion.
One key advantage of HIR is that it preserves the main equations of the basic Melitz model, thereby allowing us to apply our previous results in a relatively straightforward manner.
We brie ‡y derive the equations of HIR that are relevant for our purpose and refer the reader to the original article for more details. For ease of comparison, we try to follow the original notation whenever possible. Production depends on the productivity of the …rm, ', the measure of hired workers, h, and the average ability of these workers, a:
where 2 (0; 1) implies diminishing returns to hired workers. Two important properties of this production function are the complementarity between …rm productivity and average worker ability and a trade-o¤ between the quantity and quality of hired workers.
Workers'ability is assumed to be independently distributed and drawn form a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k > 1 and c.d.f. G a (a) = 1 (a min =a) k . Search frictions in the labor market imply that a …rm has to pay bn units of the numeraire to be matched randomly with a measure n of workers. Ability is unknown. However, once the match is formed, the …rm can use a screening technology to identify workers with ability below a c at the cost of ca c = units of the numeraire, with c > 0, > k. Given the distribution of ability, a …rm matched with n workers and screening at the cuto¤ a c will hire a measure h = n (a min =a c ) k of workers with an average ability of a = a c k= (k 1) :
Following the notation in HIR, we de…ne 1 1= . Then, total revenue of a …rm with productivity ' can be written as
where I is an indicator function taking value 1 if the …rm decides to export and zero otherwise.
Wages are determined through strategic bargaining between the …rm and workers, after the …rm has paid all the costs. HIR show that the outcome is that the …rm retains a fraction of revenues equal to the Shapley value, 1= (1 + ), and pays the rest to the workers. Thus, the pro…t maximization problem of the …rm is:
and the …rst-order conditions for n and a c are 1 + r(') = bn(')
Inspection reveals immediately that …rms with higher revenue sample more workers (higher n) and screen more intensively (higher a c ). Assuming > k also ensures that …rms with higher revenue hire more workers.
Substituting the …rst-order conditions for n and a c into the pro…t function yields
f If x , with 1 (1 k) = . Since revenues are increasing in productivity, the …xed costs implies that …rms with ' < ' exit (where I=0 (' ) = f ) and …rms with ' > ' x export (where I=0 (' x ) = I=1 (' x )). Moreover, the relative revenue of any two …rms only depends on their relative productivity and export status:
Combining these results, we …nd an expression for ex-ante expected pro…ts, E [ ], which turns out to be identical to the one in the previous section (equation 10) after the rede…nition of the parameter & = = (instead of 1). The ratio of the cuto¤s is now:
which is still increasing in &.
The equilibrium v depends on &, f and as implied by equation (14) and, in particular, it is increasing in &. The di¤erence, however, is that & corresponds now to a combination of more parameters, & =
1
(1 k)= 1 , so that in this extended version of the model there are more determinants of v. In particular, through their impact on &, an increase in or a fall in k and leads …rms to draw from more dispersed distributions. These results are intuitive. As already discussed, more risk taking is optimal for the …rm when pro…ts are more convex in productivity. In the simpler version of the model, convexity only depends on . Now, instead, the pro…t function is more convex also when there are weaker diminishing returns (high ) and when screening -which is disproportionately bene…cial to more productive …rms -is more e¤ective, i.e., when worker ability is more dispersed and the screening cost not too elastic.
Proposition 3
The dispersion of …rm productivity, as measured by the variance of the log of ', is larger in sectors with more ability dispersion and weaker decreasing returns to scale.
What are the implications for wages? Using the de…nition of wages as a share of revenue per hired worker yields:
Since a c (') is increasing in productivity, more productive …rms pay higher wages. Due to the complementarity in production between average worker ability and productivity, more productive …rms have a stronger incentive to be more selective, hire workers with higher ability and pay them higher wages. Moreover, since wages are proportional to revenue, which jumps at the export cuto¤ ' = ' x , the model implies an exporter wage premium. More precisely, the wage paid by …rms with productivity ' can be written as
Finally, since employment, h ('), is also a power function of productivity, the wages of workers employed by domestic …rms and exporters are Pareto distributed with shape parameter:
which is decreasing in v. Thus, heterogeneity in productivity maps into wage dispersion. This allows us to state the following proposition on the impact of trade on wage inequality.
Proposition 4
More openness raises unambiguously sectoral wage dispersion among workers employed by domestic …rms and among workers employed by exporters. Conditional on not changing export status, more openness increases wage inequality between workers employed by any pair of …rms with di¤erent productivity.
Before concluding, it is important to highlight the qualitative and quantitative differences between our result and HIR. In HIR and some other existing models, trade a¤ects wage dispersion through the exporter wage premium. The sign of the e¤ect then depends on the fraction of exporters. As long as exporters are a minority, trade increases wage dispersion by raising the share of …rms paying high wages. Once exporters are a majority, instead, trade decreases wage dispersion by pushing low-wage domestic …rms to exit and making the surviving …rms more equal. Thus, the overall e¤ect of trade on inequality is inverted-U shaped. This e¤ect is present also in our model. But there is now another, potentially more powerful, force: by making all …rms more unequal, trade is changing the slope of the entire wage schedule. This second e¤ect, which is absent in HIR, implies that trade now increases wage inequality within exporters, within nonexporters, and also between the two groups of …rms. It follows that, as stated in Proposition 4, openness raises unambiguously some measures of wage inequality. Other measures of inequality, such as the Gini coe¢ cient, will instead depend on the combination of the exporter wage premium, as in HIR, and the steeper wage schedule. For those measures, depending on which e¤ect dominates, the e¤ect of trade on inequality may or may not be ambiguous.
Conclusions
In this paper, we made several contributions to the literature. First, we have taken a …rst step at uncovering some overlooked facts regarding how the distribution of …rms varies across sectors and over time. We have found that the extent of heterogeneity, measured by the standard deviation of log sales, changes systematically with industry characteristics and has increased signi…cantly over time. Second, we have proposed one possible explanation, based on the idea that …rms can choose the risk of their random productivity draw at the entry stage. The model formalizes the hypothesis that …rms can choose between larger and riskier projects with high expected payo¤s, and smaller but safer projects with lower expected returns. Third, we have found that export opportunities, by reallocating pro…ts to the most productive …rms, increase the return to risk. Finally, we have explored the implication for wage inequality and found a new channel through which trade liberalization can a¤ect the entire wage distribution and increase its dispersion: export opportunities induce more risk taking and this translates into a higher equilibrium heterogeneity both in productivity and wages. As we discussed, this mechanism di¤ers in important respects from those already emphasized in existing models.
In many ways, however, this paper raises more questions than answers. Our theory explores only one out the many forces shaping the equilibrium distribution of …rms. For example, to focus on one mechanism and preserve tractability, we left …rm dynamics and innovation by incumbent …rms out of the analysis. Within our theory, we also restricted the attention to positive implications. Yet, the model suggests interesting normative questions: do …rms take too much or too little risk, especially if workers are risk averse and insurance markets are imperfect? Does international trade introduce new externalities in the technology choice at the entry stage? Finally, our …rst look at the data is just a scratch on the surface. Much remains to be done to document extensively how …rm heterogeneity varies across sectors and time, for instance using alternative measures including estimates of …rm-level productivity, and how it a¤ects wage inequality. Although we found that more dispersion is associated to a higher export share, causality remains to be established. In our theory, export opportunity leads to …rm heterogeneity, but it is also true that more dispersion in productivity increases the fraction of exporters. Hence, by exploiting exogenous sources of variation, it would be interesting to test the relative strength of both arrows of causality. In conclusion, we hope that the last contribution of this paper will be to stimulate more research on these questions.
